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Abstract—Side-channel analysis (SCA) is an important issue
for numerous embedded cryptographic devices that carry out
secure transactions on a daily basis. Consequently, it is of
utmost importance to deploy efficient countermeasures. In this
context, we investigate the intrinsic side-channel resistance of
lightweight cryptographic S-boxes. We propose improved versions
of S-boxes that offer increased power analysis resistance, whilst
remaining secure against linear and differential cryptanalyses.
To evaluate the side-channel resistance, we work under the
Confusion Coefficient model [1] and employ heuristic techniques
to produce those improved S-boxes. We evaluate the proposed
components in software (AVR microprocessors) and hardware
(SASEBO FPGA). Our conclusions show that the model and
our approach are heavily platform-dependent and that different
principles hold for software and hardware implementations.
I. INTRODUCTION AND PREVIOUS WORK
Starting with the seminal paper of Kocher et al. [2], the
topic of differential power analysis (DPA) has been attracting
interest from both the industry and the academia. Its popularity
stems from the effectiveness of these attacks in recovering the
secret keys of smart devices, even when they are protected with
state-of-the-art cryptographic algorithms. DPA and physical
attacks in general exploit the link between the secret data
processed in a device and some unintentional leakage in
the physical implementation (side-channel information). Side-
channel information can be extracted from a multitude of phys-
ical mediums such as power consumption, timing variations
and electromagnetic emanations. This physical information
allows the adversary to perform the so-called side-channel
attacks, often with devastating effects on the device security.
Given the high impact of side-channel analysis, the re-
search community has developed a plethora of countermea-
sures, ranging from device-based solutions often categorized
as hiding (noise amplification, power supply filter, EM shield)
to algorithmic-based solutions such as masking [3]. In a similar
context, this work first evaluates the SCA vulnerabilities of
basic building blocks i.e. S-boxes. Specifically, we investigate
the current S-boxes used by lightweight ciphers such as
PRESENT [4] and PRINCE [5] and suggest improved versions
that are more resistant to DPA, while maintaining resistance
to traditional cryptanalytic techniques. Our final goal is to
establish an innovative algorithmic countermeasure that would
favor certain choices of S-boxes by exploiting the intrinsic
side-channel resistance of cryptographic primitives.
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We have identified two main obstacles when crafting a
side-channel resistant cryptographic primitive: the theoretical–
physical tradeoff and the resistance quantification problem.
Theoretical–physical tradeoff. The resistance of a crypto-
graphic algorithm to theoretic attacks such as linear [6] and
differential [7] cryptanalysis is a well studied area. However, it
has been shown that the inherent side-channel resistance of a
cipher component is inversely proportional to the component’s
resistance against linear and differential attacks [8], [9]. The
tradeoff is linked to the non-linearity property: having strong
non-linearity increases the theoretical security, whilst making
side-channel cryptanalysis easier. As a result, non-linear cipher
components such as the S-box present good targets for a side-
channel attack.
Resistance quantification. The quantification problem lies
in finding a reliable and stand-alone metric of the S-box’s
behavior under SCA. Several works in the literature attempt
to quantify the resistance of a block cipher implementation
against power analysis. Guilley and Pacalet propose Signal
to Noise Ratio in DPA as the first proposal to measure
the level of leakage expected from a design [8]. Given the
prevalence of S-boxes as non-linear cipher building blocks,
Prouff proposes “transparency order”, attempting to evaluate
different S-boxes w.r.t. DPA resistance. This metric attracted
attention from researchers, yet the attainable level of improve-
ment (in terms of side-channel security) seems to be platform-
dependent. Elaborating on this conclusion, Mazumdar et al.
have generated new S-boxes following the transparency order
definition. They performed an experimental verification on
an FPGA [10], [11] and their work presented a substantial
improvement in the number of measurements required until
the recovery of the secret key. On the other hand, Picek et
al. showed that a such increase in the level of security is
not observed when considering 8 × 8 S-boxes in software
implementations [12]. The situation is somewhat different
when 4×4 S-boxes are examined, since it is possible to achieve
much bigger differences in the transparency order values [13].
Yet again, a closer look at the practical analysis shows that
the increase in security against DPA does not go hand-in-hand
with an improved transparency order. Finally, Chakraborty et
al. presented limitations to Prouff’s “transparency order” and
proposed amendments to the metric [14].
In this paper, we investigate whether a single S-box can
be generated to resist side-channel analysis in both software
and hardware platforms. Our results prove this being a complex
question and the differences in the ways we model leakages for
software and hardware imply the variability in the “measured”
978-1-4799-8391-9/15/$31.00 ©2015 IEEE 2013
SCA resistance for the two cases.
The paper is organized as follows: we discuss the the-
oretical background in Sect. II and describe the resistance
quantification and the generation of the improved S-box.
We continue with the experimental results on AVR ATmega
microcontroller and SASEBO FPGA board in Sect. III. We
conclude in Sect. IV.
II. BACKGROUND
Analyzing individual S-boxes requires an evaluation met-
ric/model that clearly separates the effect of the physical
characteristics of the device under attack (such as noise) from
the algorithmic effect of the cipher/component that we target.
For this purpose, we use the Confusion Coefficient model as
proposed by Fei et al. [1], [15].
The suggested model is closely related to the selection
function (sometimes also called the sensitive variable) that we
use to perform the attack. In this work, we attack a software,
lookup-table-based implementation of a PRESENT-like1
cipher. We use a 4×4 S-box, our target intermediate value is
the S-box output and the power model we use is the Hamming
weight (HW) of the intermediate value. Thus, the selection
function 𝑓 is the following:
𝑓(𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡, 𝑘𝑒𝑦) = 𝐻𝑊 (𝑆𝑏𝑜𝑥(𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡⊕ 𝑘𝑒𝑦)) (1)
Given two different keys 𝑘1, 𝑘2, where 𝑘1 ∕= 𝑘2, Fei et al. [1]
define the confusion coefficient 𝜅:
𝜅(𝑘1, 𝑘2) = 𝐸[(𝑓(𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡, 𝑘1)− 𝑓(𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡, 𝑘2))2] (2)
where 𝐸 denotes the expected value of (𝑓(𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡, 𝑘1) −
𝑓(𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡, 𝑘2))
2 over all possible inputs. The resulting 𝜅(𝑘1, 𝑘2)
describes the effect of an algorithmic confusion: a large value
indicates that it is easy to distinguish between keys 𝑘1,
𝑘2 if you perform a side-channel attack with the selection
function 𝑓 . In general, the coefficient 𝜅(𝑘𝑖, 𝑘𝑗) demonstrates
the probability of distinguishing between two keys.
In order to fully characterize the behavior of the selection
function 𝑓 (and as a result the behavior of the S-box), we need
to compute all possible values of 𝜅. After acquiring all possible
𝜅 values, we proceed in crafting the frequency distribution of
the confusion coefficients for the chosen S-box.
For a given size of the target selection function (e.g. the
HW of the 4-bit S-box output specified in Eqn. (1), the mean
of the frequency distribution remains constant. According to
Heuser et al. [9], highly non-linear components lead to a
frequency distribution with low variance, compared to linear
elements, which demonstrate high variance. As a result, in
order to improve side-channel resistance, we need to search
for S-boxes whose frequency distributions demonstrate high
variance. To this end, we employ heuristic techniques (for full
description see [16]) such as genetic algorithms that generate
new S-boxes with high distribution variance, yet sufficient
resistance to linear and differential cryptanalysis.
1We refer to the cryptographic primitive as PRESENT-like because we
create 2 instances of the cipher: one with the original PRESENT S-box and
one with the improved S-box.
TABLE I. VARIANCE OF THE CONFUSION COEFFICIENT COMPUTED
FOR DIFFERENT S-BOXES.
PRESENT Phantom New
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜅) 0.6600 1.3880 1.3629
Following the heuristics we have generated two “improved”
S-boxes the so-called “Phantom” and “New” that are defined
as follows:
Phantom = {6, 4, 7, 8, 0, 5, 2, 10, 14, 3, 13, 1, 12, 15, 9, 11}
New = {15, 11, 8, 4, 2, 0, 14, 13, 9, 3, 1, 5, 12, 10, 7, 6}
The first “improved” S-box demonstrates an increased variance
of the frequency distribution (see Table I), when compared to
the original S-box, while it remains in the “optimal” S-box
classes as defined by Leander et al. [17]. The improved S-box
actually exhibits increased resistance (resembling the behavior
of a linear element). However, it results in ghost peaks during
our SCA (see Section III), thus, we refer to it as the “Phantom
S-box”.
The “New” S-box, on the other hand, does not result in
ghost peaks in a software setting and in fact has a lower
variance of the distribution of the confusion coefficient when
compared to the Phantom S-box (see Table I). Nevertheless,
when implemented on hardware, this S-box yielded the best
results in our experiments presented in Section III.
Fig. 1. Confusion coefficient frequency distribution for the improved
PRESENT S-box
III. RESULTS AND EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we investigate experimentally if the “Phan-
tom” S-box (first introduced by Picek et al. [16]) provides
increased security in a real world setting (software and hard-
ware). Rather than implementing only the S-box lookup for
testing purposes, we take the more realistic approach of
embedding the S-box in PRESENT cipher [4]. Note that the
confusion coefficient (and its distribution) is computed using
the selection function of a given cryptographic algorithm. In
section II we demonstrated that it is possible to use heuristics
in order to generate S-boxes resistant to a specific selection
function. Namely, the “Phantom” S-box was tailor-made to
be resistant to the selection function 𝑓 that is used in attacks
on software PRESENT implementations. Thus, it is of direct
interest to verify whether this holds in AVR software imple-
mentations (III-A) and also investigate its behavior in an FPGA
context (III-B).
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Our choice of PRESENT is motivated by its standardiza-
tion as a lightweight block cipher with a 4×4 S-box [18].
PRESENT employs the substitution permutation network
(SPN) design: the S-Layer is formed of 4×4 S-box lookups
to provide non-linearity, and the P-Layer is a bit permutation
that ensures diffusion.
A. Software (AVR)
For software analysis, we chose an AVR smartcard with an
ATmega163 microcontroller. We used Riscure Power Tracer
3 to communicate with the smartcard and extract the power
consumption traces using a LeCroy WaveRunner 610Zi Os-
cilloscope. We acquired 2 500 traces and using the low-
noise measurements supplied by the Power Tracer, run 50
independent experiments (with 50 traces each) to generate the
guessing entropy plot presented in Figure 2. The ATmega163
microcontroller leaks the Hamming weight of the intermediate
values and naturally, we choose the selection function 𝑓 as
specified in Eqn. (1).
As shown in Figure 2, the “Phantom” [16] behavior pre-
vents the attack to be 100% successful. The phantom behavior
can be summarized as follows: for a given phantom 𝑛 × 𝑛
S-box, there exists a constant 𝑐𝑝 such that when two inputs to
the S-box have the XOR difference of 𝑐𝑝 in between, sum of
Hamming weight values of the outputs will add up to 𝑛. In the
current case, since the Hamming weight of the S-box outputs
add up to 4, the attacker cannot be certain that the top candidate
is in fact the correct one without precise knowledge of how the
target device leaks data. An example to the mentioned property
of the phantom S-box, where 𝑐𝑝 = 0x9, is as follows:
𝐼𝑛𝑝1 = 0x4
𝐼𝑛𝑝2 = 0x4⊕ 0x9 = 0xC
𝑂𝑢𝑡1 = 𝑆(𝐼𝑛𝑝1) = 0x0→ HW(0x0) = 0
𝑂𝑢𝑡2 = 𝑆(𝐼𝑛𝑝2) = 0xF→ HW(0xF) = 4.
In other words, phantom behavior of an S-box sometimes
implies wrong conclusions in terms of SCA resistance for the
reason outlined above.
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Fig. 2. Guessing entropy with respect to the number of processed traces.
B. Hardware (FPGA)
For Hardware analysis we chose to use the SASEBO board
with a XILINX Virtex-II Pro (XC2VP7) FPGA for running
the PRESENT design. The block diagram of the design we
implemented in FPGA is given in Fig. 3. As shown in the
figure, the data register is updated at each round only once.
This makes the selection function 𝑔 slightly more complicated
than the one used in the software case. When attacking from
the input, rather than simply computing the Hamming weight
of the S-box output, we need to put the values through the
P-layer and compute which bit positions in the data register
are affected. Then, we compute the Hamming distance (HD)
between the old and new register state, in order to estimate
the power consumption
𝑔(𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡, 𝑘𝑒𝑦) = 𝐻𝐷(𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑑, 𝑅𝑛𝑒𝑤) =
𝐻𝐷(𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑑(0, 16, 32, 48), 𝑃 (𝑆(𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑑(0, 1, 2, 3)⊕ 𝑘𝑒𝑦). (3)
We emphasize again the fact that the improved S-box was
crafted for the software selection function 𝑓 , based on the
Hamming weight leakage assumption.
Input
Data Register
S-Layer
P-Layer
⊕
Output
Keyri
Keyr31 ⊕
Fig. 3. Block diagram of the implemented PRESENT cipher core.
For the experiments, we acquired a total of 150 000 traces
for the new S-box we generated, 70 000 traces for the phantom
S-box, and 50 000 traces for the original PRESENT using
a LeCroy WaveRunner 610Zi oscilloscope. To compute the
guessing entropy diagram [19], ten separate attacks are run
and the results obtained from the attacks are summarized in
Figure 4. As it is clearly visible in the figure, the behavior
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Fig. 4. Guessing entropy with respect to the number of processed traces.
of the phantom S-box in an FPGA implementation is rather
similar compared to the behavior of the original PRESENT
S-box. Thus, we observe that an S-box crafted to reduce the
Hamming weight leakage has negligible effect when applied
in a context where Hamming distance leakage is prevalent. On
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the other hand, the new S-box given in Section II acts rather
different when compared to phantom and original PRESENT
S-boxes. From these experiments we can deduce that improved
security (in terms of SCA resistance) for a particular leakage
model does not necessarily imply adequately improved security
in another setting.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have investigated the security of an S-box,
which is generated to provide improved side-channel security
in a software setting, when it is taken out of context and anal-
ysed in a hardware setting. The results show that in the case of
PRESENT-like SPN-ciphers, security in software environment
does not imply security in a hardware environment. On the
contrary, when an S-box with a lower confusion coefficient
variance (in terms of Hamming weight leakage) is generated,
one may get improved security on an FPGA. Hence, the search
for the “silver bullet” when it comes to DPA resistant S-boxes
which provide security in both software and hardware remains
an open problem.
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